SMU Law Review
Volume 31

Issue 5

Article 11

January 1978

Book Review

Recommended Citation
Book Review, 31 SW L.J. 1177 (1978)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol31/iss5/11

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information,
please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

BOOK REVIEW
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW. By LIONEL S. SOBEL. New
York: Law-Arts Publishers, Inc. 1977. Pp. xxviii, 839.
For a book that contains an introduction by Howard Cosell and a preface
on "Sports and the Arts" by an unknown pundit who sounds like Professor
Irwin Corey or Foster Brooks of nightclub fame, this volume's strange
mixture of gossip and research comes across better than one would expect.
The structure for a serious text on the laws affecting professional sports
exists in skeletal form, reverentially and duodecimally arranged: a chapter
on tax problems; a discourse on league wars; a section on immigration; and a
disquisition on sports broadcasting. The work, however, is neither journalese nor jurisprudence. Some chapters provide a useful collection of cases
and others suggest the areas of pivotal disputes, but a number of sections are
superficial in analysis, incomplete in their practical application, and fail to
demonstrate the capacity to anticipate or interpret the flow of developments
in the law.
We are given blow-by-blow accounts of the battles between an errant
linebacker or a peripatetic basketball player and the clubs competing for
their talent and their discarded contracts; but the chapter on collective
bargaining (ch. 4), for example, fails to detect the ultimate solution of the
reserve clause problem which was projected and implemented in the Mackey
v. NationalFootballLeagueI and Robertson v. NationalBasketball Association2 decisions. What emerges from a careful reading of this tome is
popular history, and the kind of popular history that is vented on weary
night school students eager for an "inside" view that does not harm the
cerebral processes. As popular historian, which is the most charitable title I
can award him, Mr. Sobel has rather obvious heros: Gary Davidson, the
pied piper who led the outlaw leagues to bankruptcy or merger; Bill Bradley
and Bernie Parrish, who, accompanied by their legal champions, made the
Sherman Antitrust Act into a civil rights statute to free the "player slaves";
and Messrs. Noll and Okner, who created the statistical data and mathematical economics to support the player assaults on league mergers, reserve
systems, players' drafts and the Rozelle rule. 3 In his introduction, Howard
1. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).

2. [1977] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

61,474 (2d Cir. June 19, 1977).

3. GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS (R. Noll ed. 1974). Mr. Sobel relies heavily

upon the Noll results (see, e.g., pp. 243, 544, 549-55). As to their validity see Hearings Before
the House Select Comm. on ProfessionalSports (Sisk Comm.), 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at
148 (1976) (supplementary material addressed by Hamilton Carothers to Rep. John F.
Seiberling):
Since the publication of his book in 1974, Dr. Noll has become a familiar figure in
the sports world. He has appeared as a witness [in 6 different proceedings
involving professional sports]. In the course of these various appearances Dr.
Noll has been thoroughly examined on the theories and commentary set forth in
his book and on the research and investigation which preceded the book's publication. It has been established that the book was edited and published with the
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Cosell growls: "Sportswriters and sports announcers now have a place to
turn to so that they can discover . . . what the law is all about ... " (p.
xvi). Well, what is it all about?
I. CHANGE AND OBSOLESCENCE
Writing a book on professional sports is like trying to take a photograph of
Concorde with a Brownie camera: things go flying by too fast. Since the
publication of this book many of the decisions and facts upon which Mr.
Sobel's comments are based have become stale. For example, much of
chapter 10, covering professional sports broadcasting, has been rendered
obsolete (in particular § 10.3 and § 10.4). By denying certiorari on October 4,
1977, in Home Box Office v. FCC4 the Supreme Court let stand the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia holding invalid the
FCC's anti-siphoning rules, thus frustrating that agency's attempt to prevent
the move of sports programming from "free" television to pay cable.
The author's reliance upon "per se-ism" in his discussions of antitrust

and professional sports has been tainted by several court actions. Two
federal district courts have upheld the validity of NHL by-law 12.6, prohibiting one-eyed hockey players from being eligible for play in the NHL, as
a reasonable rule unrelated to anti-competitive purpose, despite a Sherman
Act attack on the by-law as being invalid per se.5

The insulation against antitrust attack of a collectively bargained player
draft, option system, and Rozelle or compensation rule for player losses has
been authorized by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey; such provisions have been

implemented by collective bargaining agreements in basketball, football,
and hockey. At least as to those agreements arising from the settlement of
litigation and challenged by individual dissenting players, the decision of the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Robertson and the decision of
Judge Larson in Kermit Alexander v. National Football League6 support
approving the settlement and collective bargaining agreements reached folauthors having practically no information whatever relating to professional football. Dr. Noll's source materials consisted almost entirely of the World Almanac, newspaper clippings, a 1967 financial statement of the Philadelphia
Eagles (obtained in a bankruptcy proceeding), and an out-of-date annual report
of the New England Patriots. It was also established that Dr. Noll devoted less
than six weeks of his time to the book's preparation-a period which allowed
him approximately ten days for a study of each of the four different professional
sports he purported to 'analyze.'
Compare Dr. Noll's response, id. at 158. My own examination of the Noll-Okner work
disclosed some serious errors in my own field. For example, no financial data for specific
National Hockey League teams was examined by the authors, although a number of the clubs
are publicly held and publish annual reports. As to the authors' suggestion that the domination
of the league standings by the Montreal Canadiens demonstrates that reserve systems do not
produce competitive balance, the authors failed to note (and perhaps had not discovered) that
for many years, through 1969 (a recent year in their data), the Canadiens had a prior right,
regardless of league finish, sponsorship of clubs, minor league affiliations, or the common
draft, to the first two choices of French Canadian sons of French Canadian fathers!
4. 2 MED. L. REP. 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Aug. 30,
1977).
5. Neeld v. National Hockey League, Civ. No. 77-32 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1977) (decided
largely on res judicata grounds); Neeld v. National Hockey League, No. 75-1873 RHS (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 23, 1976); cf. Neeld v. National Hockey League, Civ. No. 77-544 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.
25, 1977) (preliminary injunction granted under New York Human Relations statute).
6. No. 4-26-Civil 123 (D. Minn. July 29, 1977).
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lowing remand from the court of appeals decision in Mackey. The "per seism" on which Mr. Sobel relies for his judgment on the antitrust invalidity of
these essential parts of the professional sports structure has itself been
reexamined and modified in a related area by a June 1977 decision of the
Supreme Court. 7 In overruling United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co.' the
Court opened the field of territorial allocation to the rule of reason, thus
casting further doubt on Mr. Sobel's castigation (pp. 502-05) of a California
federal court's holding that the league's refusal to permit the transfer of an
NHL franchise from Oakland to Vancouver did not violate the antitrust
laws. 9
Now before us is the wild and woolly free agent market of baseball
resulting from the arbitrators' findings in the Messersmith and McNally
matters, that baseball's "reserve clause," 10 theretofore thought to be perpetual, was only enforceable as a one-year option. The results of the American League baseball races in the past two years-with the New York
Yankees buying "free agent" slugger Reggie Jackson and free agent pitchers Gullett and Hunter, and thus buying themselves a pennant-will (notwithstanding the Sobel commentary) confirm the fears and trepidations of
all the sports owners who assert that their leagues cannot survive loss of the
draft, reserve, and compensation system. These are essential factors in
preserving competitive balance and the incentive to invest in the professional sports industry.
Finally, players themselves have, since the publication of this book,
negotiated the details of and approved (for a quid pro quo or as part of
collective barbaining of other issues) varying versions of the Rozelle rule in
each of the baseball, basketball, football, and hockey collective bargaining
agreements. 1 This suggests that the players recognize the importance and
reasonableness of this concept for the economic health of their own sports
and the security of their own competitive position and salary.
The largest part of Mr. Sobel's volume is devoted to the reserve clause,
the draft, labor law matters, and the concomitant use of these issues as
weapons of attack in the interleague "wars." This era, and concern with
these problems, may be coming to an end. In the face of the excessive and
unrealistic salary levels produced by the promoters and the uneconomic
bidding practices of the "outlaw" leagues, all of the new leagues of recent
vintage have either expired, merged, or been absorbed (or in the case of the
WHA flirted with such absorption). The collective bargaining solutions of
the disputes over the draft, the option system, and the Rozelle rule (what the
7. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 53 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1977).
8. 388 U.S. 365 (1977).
9. San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal.
1974).

10. In essence, the reserve clause prohibits a player who has been "reserved" by his team
from signing with any other team for a period beyond the fixed term of his contract.
Ii. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) dated 3/1/77, art. XV; NHL CBA dated
5/4/76, § 9.03, approving NHL by-law 9A; Baseball CBA effective 1/1/76, art. XVII C(2); NBA
CBA dated 4/29/76, art. XVI(c) (providing for a phaseout, however, after the 1980-81 season).
The CBA's are reprinted in PLI HANDBOOK No. 84, REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL & COLLEGE
SPORTS TEAMS & LEAGUES (1977).
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NHL calls its "equalization" by-law)-solidified by the court approvals in
the Kermit Alexander and Robertson cases-may have removed these issues from the litigating arena and placed them at the bargaining table where
both parties have an interest in such rules, an idea originally suggested by
Justice Thurgood Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Flood v. Kuhn. 2 To
be sure, there will be problems of interpretation and application, and, five to
ten years from now when extensions or modifications of the union contracts
must be negotiated, disputes may flare up again. Mr. Sobel's chapter on
collective bargaining, again superficial and limited in scope, rejects the
approach of Justice Marshall in Flood and the seminal article by Jacobs and
Winter delineating the interplay of the national labor policy in favor of
collective bargaining with antitrust doctrines. 3 The court of appeals in the
Mackey decision accepted this solution, and the players and owners implemented it and received the imprimatur of the courts in Robertson and
Alexander.
II.

TAXATION

The chapter on "tax aspects of team and league operations" (ch. 9) is
typical of Mr. Sobel's scope and depth. One would hope for a practical or
thoroughly researched analysis of the many areas in which tax laws impact
the acquisition of a franchise, the operation of a team, or the negotiation of a
player's contract. Instead, one finds an uncritical and superficial apeing of
the attack on depreciation or amortization of player contracts first mounted
by the NBA Players' Association in the hearings on the first proposed
ABA/NBA merger before the Senate Judiciary Committee.14 At the hearing,
the NBA Players' Association countered the claim by the ABA and NBA
owners that the merger was required to avoid the bankruptcy of the numerous losing franchises with the charge that, when amortization of players'
contracts was added back to produce "cash flow," the book losses did not
demonstrate the real financial result of the operations of the teams proposing the merger and the teams were not suffering as much as they claimed. 5
The players' star witness, Roger Noll, probably did not intend to produce
the elimination of a claimed unfair tax advantage to owners; but his analysis,
repeated in a study with his colleague, Benjamin Okner, under the distinguished auspices of the Brookings Institute, 6 had that unfortunate consequence. It must be recognized that the practice of basketball in the allocation of cost to players' contracts represented one of the more extreme
examples of tax "planning," and the Noll-Okner table showing as much as
100 percent for one team and an average for all NBA clubs of 85.4 percent of
purchase cost allocated to player contracts reappeared in and was quoted
12. 407 U.S. 258, 294 (1972).
13. See Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of
Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971), quoted approvingly by Justice Marshall, 407 U.S.
at 295, and found not persuasive by Sobel (pp. 323-29).
14. See Hearings on S. 2373 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 412 (1971-1972).
15. Id. at 341 (statement of Roger Noll).
16. GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, supra note 3, ch.5.
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specifically by the House Ways and Means Committee in its report introducing the 1975 Tax Reform Bill.' 7 Despite strong efforts by the other sports to
demonstrate that this extreme practice, coupled with the "revolving door"
through which owners went in and out of professional basketball, was not
typical of the industry, 8 the Noll-Okner presentation certainly contributed
to the enactment in the 1976 Tax Reform Act of sections 1056(d) and
1245(a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. The first imposes a rebuttable
presumption of fifty percent of the amount of the purchase price which can
be allocated to player contracts. The second imposes a special depreciation
recapture rule, unlike that imposed on any other industry, requiring that
amortization deducted on the contracts of players who were on the original
roster of a team at the time it was acquired must be recaptured on the sale of
the franchise, even though that sale takes place many years later when those
players may no longer be on the roster. Thus, the consequences-which Mr.
Sobel does not advert to-of the players' strategy in opposing the merger
before Congress has been to discourage the entry of new owners into the
professional sports business and to reduce the funds from which the players
wish the owners to pay the very high salaries which the players sought to
save. 19
Remarkably, there is no consideration in this book of the serious tax
problems with which counsel for the professional athlete must be concerned. With players' salaries at their present level, counsel must first focus on
the maximum tax and the uses of income averaging (which may not be
sufficient). If he finds that he can produce a more favorable package for his
client, and one more acceptable to the owner, if the compensation is deferred in whole or in part, he must consider the tax consequences of
deferment, the uses of unqualified plans, and the knotty problem of how, if
possible, to secure or collateralize the payment of the deferred salary or
bonus (and the earnings on the amount deferred) without subjecting the
player to income tax on the commuted value of the installments in the year
they are earned, rather than in the year of payment.2 If his client is
sophisticated or has other business interests he must consider the possibility
of a playing contract between the club and the player's corporation; conse17. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 116 (1975) (citing R. NOLL & B. OKNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL BASKETBALL (1971)).

18. See, for example, the statement of Robert 0. Swados filed with the Senate Finance
Committee on behalf of the National Hockey League in opposition to provisions of H.R. 10612
affecting professional sports, reprinted in the Sisk Committee Hearings. Hearings, supra note
3, at 207-12.
19. In the face of other tax onslaughts, the Mackey case may be relevant not only in the
antitrust field but in tax controversies. One of the most negative observations in the testimony
before the Sisk Committee was the statement by the then counsel for the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue, Lawrence Woodworth (made before the announcement of the court of
appeals opinion in Mackey). Id. at 340. He argued that the recent decisions by the courts under
the antitrust laws cutting down perpetual option clauses, invalidating the drafts and the Rozelle
rule, indicated that restraints designed to maintain a club's rights to a player's services over a
long term were invalid, and that there was, therefore, little justification for the allocation of
substantial sums to player contracts on the acquisition of a franchise. The court of appeals
decision in Mackey may well provide an important rebuttal -of this testimony and justification
for the allocation and amortization practices of member clubs.
20. See Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 C.B. 193; Rev. Rul. 6031, 1960-1 C.B. 174, ex. 4.
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quently, the attorney must also consider: whether the regulations of the
league permit such contracts with or without personal guarantees; 21whether
the corporation will be treated as bona fide by the Internal Revenue Service; 22 whether the contract can be used to establish a pension plan and other
compensation deferrals; and how to persuade the employer to handle the
withholding tax problems created by the corporate plan. If the player is a
foreign national or if the league has Canadian cities or international play, he
and the club must be concerned with the allocation of income among the
countries involved, the foreign tax, and the effect of available credit and
treaty provisions. There is no mention of any of these in Mr. Sobel's opus.
III. THE PROBLEM OF FAILING FRANCHISES
There is evidence that no professional sports league can operate successfully if it has competition, and that even with no competing league, the
bloom may be off the peach. 23 The World Football League expired only
shortly after it emerged from the womb. The AFL disappeared into the older
establishment with the help of Congress. The ABA, having withered to four
teams, was permitted to enter at least the foyer of the NBA upon the
payment of large sums of money as entrance fees, only to find that the honor
had become dubious when they were pleading near insolvency six months
later. 24 The WHA has left a trail of abandoned franchises (in New York,
Cleveland, St. Paul, for example) but still survives despite months of discussions aborted by the failure in August 1977 of the NHL Board of Governors
to approve a plan of expansion. Even the established leagues can produce
losers. 25 A writer on the law and professional sports would have done well to
deal with the problems of the failing franchises, whatever his "tilt." Does
the individual player have a prior or preferred claim for his salary, accrued,
deferred, contingent, or unsecured? Does the player have the right to terminate his playing contract in the event of bankruptcy or creditor proceedings?
Can the trustee in bankruptcy intervene under the equity powers of the
federal court to preserve the players' contracts as a major asset of the
bankrupt franchise? Dependent upon the form of the bankruptcy proceedings-straight bankruptcy or reorganization under chapter XI-does the
court having jurisdiction over the creditors' proceedings have the power, in
effect, to trade the player to a new owner by approving the sale of the
player's contract?
21. See NHL by-law 2(e).
22. Compare Rev. Rul. 74-331, 1974-2 C.B. 282, and Rev. Rul. 74-330, 1974-2 C.B. 278,
with Ingmar Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964), and Borge v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 816, aff'd as modified and remanded for recomputation of deficiency,
405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968).
23. FORTUNE, May 1977, at 295:
But it is a fact that franchise values are not rising the way they used to, and
many, in fact, have declined. Ten years ago it was rare to hear of a team in any
sport losing so much money as to be heavily endangered; now no sport except
football is without at least a couple of marginal teams, and in hockey a majority
are losing money. Many franchises in the World Hockey Association, which may
have played its last season, have a market value close to zero.
24. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1977, § 5, at I, col. 2.
25. For example, the former franchise holders of the Pittsburgh NHL Club went through
ch. XI proceedings in 1975. No. 75-4% (W.D. Pa. 1975).
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Moreover, how about the owner and the league? When the owner defaults
in the payment of the player's contract, can the league take over, cure the
default, and sell the contract? Some leagues have provisions in their constitution and by-laws giving the governing body of the league the right to
terminate the franchise for nonpayment of dues or other default. Is the
league's right to terminate superior to that of secured or unsecured creditors? Can the league's attempt to terminate and sell the franchise and player
contracts to someone else be obstructed by the equity powers of the bankruptcy court? When the league attempts to sell, must it proceed according to
the Uniform Commercial Code standards and how are they applied? Can the
league be required on a transfer of the franchise to new owners in a new city
to see that all player claims are paid? Mr. Sobel does not effectively deal
with these issues.
IV. AGENTS
One of the other areas neglected by Mr. Sobel's work is the pervasive
growth of the player agent and the multiple legal problems created by some
cases of duplicity and conflict of interest, and some agents' incompetence or
negligence.26 The outlaw league and free agent syndrome create a bidding
war at artificial, unrealistic salary levels. An agent, who may or may not be
professionally trained, with some flair for haggling like an Oriental peddler,
attracts 200 financially virgin athletes with fine athletic skills but with tax
planning, investment, cash flow, and money-management problems for
which the professional haggler (frequently) has neither expertise nor understanding, neither staff nor the wisdom to delegate. Often, in the earlier years
of the "outlaw" league, the haggler is employed as a headhunter for the new
league-sometimes with a fixed price paid by the new league or new club for
each athlete-a fact sometimes not disclosed to the player. To protect his
fee (and no one represents the player in this negotiation) the agent either
slices his ten to fifteen percent off the top of the player's salary for the term
of the contract ("up front"), or requires the new club to pay him directly
(with hope of a deduction). While the player is toiling on the field, the ice, or
the court his once-in-a-lifetime compensation is coming not to him, but to
the agent's modest office. Suddenly six hundred tax returns must be filed,
several hundred security purchases made, and 5,000 checks must be written-for expenses, for investment, for allowances. After the contract publicity comes the deluge of brokers and touts: no unexciting bank accounts
for the player's money-tax shelters (uneconomic but so "saving" of taxes), big real estate deals, high fliers in the market. What is the application of
trust and fiduciary rules in the player-agent situation? Is there any way for
the league or the players' association to police or control the employment of
unqualified representatives?
In the bidding competition between two leagues candor is hardly the rule,
and the agent may never disclose to the players what the competing league
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1977, at 65, col. 3. Agent Richard Sorkin, a former
sportswriter, pleaded guilty to the misappropriation of more than $360,000 from seven players
he represented.
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proposes. What is the effect of this non-disclosure on the enforceability of
the playing contract by the club? Suppose the player wants a "no trade"
clause-illegal under the league rules. A frequent practice is to set this forth
in a separate letter-never filed with the league office. Is this "no trade"
clause enforceable? Is the playing contract valid? Suppose the new club fails
to pay the agent? Is this the breach of an obligation which entitles the player
to termination-and to become a free agent himself?
Suppose the player still has deferred compensation coming from the old
club. A host of problems arise in a trade, a new contract after a jump, or a
draft when the new club does not expressly assume the ancient obligation.
Can the player terminate his duty to play for the new club if his old employer
does not complete the payment of the deferred bonus or salary? Mr. Sobel's
book neither solves nor supplies guidelines for these problems.
V.

CONCLUSION

This highly promoted industry, important to the world of so many large
communities, will never be far from attack. (An owner once told me, noting
our attempts at good public relations: "Bob, stop trying to make the fans
love you. They love the players; they want to hate the owners!") Even after
the serious blows to incentives for investment in sports inspired by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, the United States Treasury is considering new legislation aimed at disallowing or limiting the deduction from federal taxable
income of tickets for sporting events and other entertainment. 27 Ralph
Nader has announced the formation of a task force to expose the "rip offs"
in the sports arena, including the declining size of the hot dog (frankfurter,
not roll-no argument here), and the trading away of popular players (plenty
of argument there!). Perhaps we shall see the day when the Supreme Court
will apply a one-fan, one-vote rule to determine whether Sven Svenson, a
Swedish hockey player with a United States team shall be traded to the
Russian Nationals, and must decide the antitrust law of which foreign state
shall be applied?
What one misses most of all in this work is an overview. That is not to say
that Mr. Sobel gives no indication of his bias or tilt. For example, he deals
with the right of a professional sports league to restrict the transfer of a
28
franchise from one city to another (pp. 500-12). With the Milwaukee court
holding that the grant of permission to transfer was a violation of the
antitrust laws, Mr. Sobel cites with approval a student note 29 "holding" that
a refusal to permit a transfer is a per se violation of the Sherman Act (giving
the League only a Hobson's choice), and disdainfully rejecting a ruling to
the contrary by the only court that has met the issue head on. 3" Again, "tilt"
27. Wall. St. J., Sept. 29, 1977, at i, col. 3.
28. Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., [1966] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 71,738 (Wis.
Cir. Ct.), rev'd, 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1 (1966) (three judges dissenting on ground that
exemption for baseball established by Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200
(1922), and reaffirmed by Flood, preempted state court action).
29. Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARV. L. REV. 418 (1967).
30. San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966,970 (C.D. Cal.
1974).

1977]

1185

BOOK REVIEW

is apparent in the book's treatment or characterization of the reserve clause
as producing "peonage" or "serfdom" of the player. Sam Ervin's "antislavery" constitutional pronouncements ex cathedra are reported with full
approval (p. 234), but the express rulings of the district court and Supreme
Court in Flood to the contrary 3'-holding that no issue of involuntary
servitude is presented-are not cited at all.
I would suggest as an overview of the field that the antitrust laws as
applied to professional sports are like an elephant at the piano. It may be
that Federal Baseball Club v. National League32 was not Mr. Justice Oliver
Holmes' "happiest day"; but it is hard to believe that conservative old Mr.
Sherman, with his focus on the giant trusts, could have imagined that the
blunderbuss of a statute which bears his name would be used to prevent the
punishment of a lady golfer who is charged with surreptitiously moving her
ball in the rough," or an attempt to force hockey players to risk blindness for
the one-eyed player and injury to themselves,3 4 or to compel a league to
admit an admitted gambler15 and "fixer" to the playing roster. The plethora
of antitrust cases in this area and the undiscriminating ways in which
counsel have applied the allegations of monopoly suggest that what we have
actually had has been abuse, rather than use, of the antitrust laws in sports
litigation. Players and owners will welcome the reestablishment of respectability for the rule of reason in professional sports. And writers in the field
should do so as well.
Postscript
The following verse is attributed to a mythical owner-cum-tax-lawyer
whose venture in professional sports began in confidence with subchapter S
and ended with sorrow in chapter XI.
TAKE ME BACK TO THE (FEDERAL) BALL GAME

OR

I

36

NEVER PROMISED YOU A ROSENBLOOM

Players' Pavane
Stars are the greatest;
Agents are knaves;
Owners are ogres;
Athletes are slaves.
Mazurka for Sportswriters
Down with Wayne Valley
Up Walter O'Malley
31. 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
32. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
33. Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
34. See Neeld v. National Hockey League, Civ. No. 77-32 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1977);
Neeld v. National Hockey League, No. 75-1873 RHS (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 1976).
35. Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
36. Carroll Rosenbloom traded his NFL Baltimore Colts for the Los Angeles Rams in 1972,
"tax free," achieving a substantial profit, but deferring the tax on the gain (see I.R.C. § 1031).

1186

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

Whatever they do is per se;
Sell half of the gallery
To pay O.J.'s salaryA star who just wants to be free!
Owner's Coda
Let us bargain together
O super star and serf:
Bury antitrust
Under the astroturf!
Robert 0. Swados*

* B.A., University of Buffalo; J.D., Harvard University. Vice President and Counsel,
Buffalo Sabres; Secretary, National Hockey League.

